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BrWse d, Battered, Satchel Lives On
By PAUL BUEGLER
Staff Writer

, A regular scene at William Mitchell is Prof. Johnson arriving for class
;~carrying a battered and bruised satchel bulging with tattered and torn
Ji otes briefs, and memoranda.
,
Students suspect that this quaint satchel must have a Jong and nostalgic
i rustory for surely Prof. Johnson is sufficiently well heeled to afford a brief
case of more modern vintage.
The history is not as long as you might think, but it is nostalgic and
it involves two men who have given much of their lives to legal education
enerally and our law school particularly.
The Prof. Johnson referred to above could be either Gordon A Johnson
ho teaches equity or his father Andrew N. Johnson, President of the
William Mitchell College of Law Board of Trustees. These two men have
perpetuated the satchel's existence for 33 years.

It symbolizes their combined 68 years of service to legaJ education.
The story begins when Prof. Andrew Johnson started teaching contracts
at one of our predecessor schools in 1917. By 1934 he had become one
of the Twin Cities' leading attorneys and received a beautiful leather
satchel as a gift from his wife. At first he used it for trial work. By 1938,
however, he used it only for carrying law school materials to class and
as a storage container between his trips to the downtown Minneapolis
night law school.
_
It was 1949 when Prof. Gordon Johnson joined the faculty as an occa
sional substitute for his father and began to share the satchel.
He became sole possessor in 1952 when, as Dean of the Minneapolis
Minnesota College of Law, Andrew Johnson retired from teaching and
became active in bringing about the consolidation that created William
Mitchell College of Law.
SATCHEL

The Zipper Ripped
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June 12 at St. Thomas

50 Seniors To Hear
N ,o ted Court Justice
By GERALD RANDALL
Staff Writer
Chief Justice James T. Harrison of the Montana Supreme Court is
the class of 1967's commencement speaker, the Dean has announced.
Commencement is slated for Monday, June 12 at 8 p. m. in the St.
Thomas Armory.
At that time an honorary Doctor
of Laws (L.L.D.) degree will be
conferred upon Chief Justice Har
rison by the William Mitchell Board
of Trustees.
Invocation v;ill be given by Dr.
Jacob C. Krebs, father of Calvin
Krebs, a graduating senior.

Arthur Stewart
Resigns From
Mitchell Board

JACK MITCHELL 'lobbies' for a non-resident service billl in· a senate subcommittee hearing. Sen..Jack Davies,
William Mitchell registrar, takes notes in foreground. Jack Mitchell is one of 15 students engaged in a full-scale
legislative baHle to push their own bills through the legislature. Tum to page 3 for story.

Former Journalist

New Con Law Prof Brings Best of
Two Worlds: Yale and Harvard
By HUGH V. PLUNKETT III
Staff Writer
Arthur Hellman, former journalist, Yale law grad and clerk to Assoc.
Justice James C. Otis of the Minnesota Supreme Court, joins the Mitchell
faculty next fall, the Dean has announced
Hellman, an assistant professor, came to the Twin Cities from New
York, received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Harvard University,
was graduated magna cum Jaude, his Bachelor of Laws from Yale.
At Yale, Hellman was an advisor
to both the moot court ( appellate
advocacy) and Barristers Union
(trial court techniques) programs.
Before entering law school, Hell
man aspired to a journalism career.
At Harvard be was editor-in-chief
of a political magazine and a mem
ber of the editorial board of the
Crimson.
His endeavors in journalism run
the gamut from .copy boy at the
New York Times to city editor of
a small-town daily in upstate New
York.
The courses Hellman will teach
include constitutional law, local
government and labor law. He is
especially interested in labor law,
since he has worked at the Na
tional Labor Relations Board with
assistant general counsel Elihu
Platt, who is the uncredited author
Arthur Hellman
of many important board decisions.

Hellman indicated that he was
also involved in an enterprise
which had constitutional law over
tones.
At Yale he established a film so
ciety which "made money faster
than we could spend it."
"We showed everything from old
Westerns to Chaplain comedies,
but it was our avant-garde movies
that drew the largest crowds," he
said.
Hellman recaJls that, "the avant
garde films were scheduled to be
shown a few weeks after the Su
preme Court's decision in Ginz
berg, which held that the courts
could consider advertising in de
termining whether the FederaJ ob
scenity statute had been violated.

"We thought it would be embarrassing if we were arrested, so our
posters just stated, 'New American
Cinema' and listed the films and
their makers.
"The undergraduates must have
been up on their movie reviews,
though, because they nearly broke
through the doors to get in.
"I should add that film enthusi
asts who came to see new film
techniques also said that we'd se
lected and arranged our films very
well."

Arthur A. Stewart, 79, retired as
member and vice president of the
Board of Trustees, William Mit
chell, in April after many years of
active service.
He will, however, remain a mem
ber of the corporation.
He is succeeded by James E.
Kelley, long-standing member of
the .corporation who also becomes
vice president of the board.
Stewart, is a retired judge of
Ramsey county district court, who
remains active, trying a few cases
through special arrangement.
A 1908 graduate of the St. Paul
College of Law, he taught evidence
at his alma mater for several years
and at William Mitchell when it
was formed.
Kelley, a St. Paul attorney, re
cently endowed the school with a
torts chair - by the Margaret H.
and James E. Kelley Foundation,
Inc. He was graduated from the
St. Paul College of Law in 1917.
There are eight members on the
board, all of whom are members
of the 30-man corporation.
The
corporation - completely
made up of lawyers - reviews the
school's operations.
The board, on the other hand,
makes key policy and manage
ment decisions.
On the Friday evening preceed
ing commencement exercises, a
party will be given for the grad
uating class. At that time awards
will be made and certificates of
appreciation will be given to
whomever each graduate desig
nates. Robert M. Regan, a Man
kato lawyer and father of gradu
ating senior John Regan is expected
to speak at the party.

•

*

Fifty seniors are expected to receive degrees; 45 are candidates
for the Juris Doctor (J.D.) degree
and five are for the degree Bache
lor of Laws (L.L.D.).
The class was small at its in
ception, numbering only 102 stu
dents.
It is the smallest graduating class
in some time and is expected to be
the smallest for some time in the
future.
Degrees with honors will be
granted to those seniors in the
upper 10 per cent of the class.

*

Justice Harrison

Chief Justice Harrison has been
in the law all his life. A North
Dakota native, he is a 1926 grad
uate of the St. Paul College of
Law, one of the schools consoli
dated into the William Mitchell
College of Law.
HARRISON

Continued on Page 6
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Abraham Affidavit,
chairman of your continuous
committee to stir up more
litigation, has devised a new
approach to the celebration
of Law Day U.S.A.

LEGAL WRITERS: Robert Ahl, John Hirte and Hugh Plunkett III.

The W illiam Mitchell Opinion is published bi-annually by the col
lege's Student Bar Association.

EDITORIALS

He proposes a longer
observance, Law Week
U.S.A., with ea~h day set
aside for a special purpose.
The first day would be
Take a Crook to Lunch
Day, for example. Other
suggestions are Take Your
Neighbor to Court Day, Sue
Daddy Day (in recognition
of the continuing erosion of
the family immunity
doctrine) and Say It With
a Summons Day. Further
nominations are invited.

Despite the myriad of non sequiturs that are hurled constantly agai.ost
the Supreme Court one ju tifiable conclu ion is tha the policy of the
Court wi,11 soon undergo a cbaoge. On February 28, Ramsey Clark

assumed the dutie a U. . Attorney General; within hours, A sociate
Justice Tom C . Clark made p ublic an October 3, 1966 letter to the
Chief Justice wherein he announced his intention to retire if his son was
appointed to the vacant post. That date with retirement, unfortunately,
is near.
Unfortunate because a ra tionale that represents a sub taotial segment
of America will also be retiring. A lthough Justice Clark ha been faceti
ous! compared to a '' hriak.ing viol t'' in First Amendment fields dming
the course of bat tle, the conservative "doctrine' he e pou ed was healthy.
His lo . will undoubtedly up et the 5-4 ·'balance' currently on the Court,
ancl, barring unfoi:e ·een chan ges and development the crossover possi
bility will be, at least temporarily, helved . T he significance of this impend
ing c hange will be felt in various areas. The r ecent case of Adderley v.
Florida exemplifie this.
There, a First Amendment case in a civil righ ts erring the conservative
minority captured J ustice :Black and perhaps, as some have suggested, the
civil right m o emeot received a mi.nor setbac k. Although o nly time will
tell the effect of-the Adderley deci ion , we do oo l think it is an illusion to
ay that if t he decision had been rendered on_ ovem ber 14, 1967, the
resul t wo uld probably have been different. Although the basic legislation
in the civil rigbLS area has been constitutional y ap proved, until now, the
pos ibility h as always loomed thar the decision could be tapped o.f their
vitality. Tha l cannot now happen .
To realize concretely the p resent situation on the Bench, it only has to
be realized that one- ixth of all the decisions rendered during tbis Term
ha been in a 5--. ratio. Of these eight Justice Clark, oddly enough, ha
been in. the majority even time . Thus, individual right and na tional
security may be given new faces also.
Accompanying the retirement of Justice Clark, is the traditional
apprehensive national speculation on whom the specific appointee will be.
Profess.ional journals, Time, and law students mull over the possibilities.
Former Justice Felix Frankfurter once commented on whether a man
changes when he takes the chair: "If he is any good he does." Despite
his dogmatic assertion and living testimony, we think he overstated the
actual situation.
The future course of an appointee's conduct, generally, isn't quite in the
state of limbo as Frankfurter stated. Mr. Justice Fortas is a primary
example. Whoever is appointed, Freeman, Fowler, Ribicoff, Marshall or
some lower judicial figure, he will possess the inherent characteristics of
the present political clime.
The next few years will be extremely interesting; four besides Clark
are soon to fall.

Summer SeminarJ Su'}geJleJ
lo Supplement CourJe Work
Do you want more than a ticket to the bar exam?
More than a core legal education, restricted to basics except for a
couple of electives in the fourth year?
If you do - and don't want to bear the pain of taking extra work for
credit - then maybe you'll agree with us, that some additional courses
could be made available to the student through a system of summer
seminars offered to third and fourth year students.
There are many forms which such a seminar could take. We suggest
one conducted in two parts. The first, forming the core of the course,
would consist of weekly discussion sessions with an instructor over a
period of 4 to 6 weeks. The sessions could be held either during the day
or in the evening.
The second part, supplementing the course work of the first, would
be a series of lectures in the general area of the seminar given by lawyers
or law professors recognized as experts in the subject.
Although the two-part system would be the most satisfactory as each
part would complement and expand the other, there are other forms
which would be worthwhile.
For example, the seminar could be offered without including in it the
lecture series.
We believe a summer seminar would give the student who wanted it
an excellent means of extending his understanding and knowledge of the
law beyond the necessarily limited scope of our law school curriculum.

Opinion Cartoon By Jerry Fearing
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Practice, Criticism Needed
To Improve Student Writing
Inability to write well is a problem which burdens
many law school graduates.
It is a problem not only for the graduate but for
the law school itself. The National Conference of
Bar Examiners at its August, 1967 meeting will con
front the question: with whom rests
the responsibility of correcting the
problem?
The assumption implicit in this
question is there are a substantial
number of law school graduates
who cannot adequately express their
thoughts in understandable terms.
The problem is not peculiar to law
schools ; other professional and
graduate schools find that their students and graduates are not well
Heidenreich
trained in the art of expressing thoughts in writing.
The problem for the law schools, however, is more
serious than for other professional and graduate
schools. The lawyer's means of doing business is
through verbal and written communication. While the
lawyer need not be a sparkling orator he must be able
to communicate his ideas to his clients, to members of
the bench, to members of administrative agencies, and
to other lawyers clearly, concisely and effectively. If
he is not adept in this respect, his effectiveness will
be greatly diminished.
Periodically the professional and graduate schools
publicly chide undergraduate schools for their failure
to properly train their students in basic fundamentals
of the English language.
The colleges in tum criticize the high schools for
their failure to teach fundamentals. The question at
the moment is not really so much one of with whom
the responsibility for the correction of this problem
lies as one of how the problem can be corrected in
the law schools.
The problem as it stands is one that can be dealt
with only in the law schools. If high schools and col
leges were to immediately revamp basic English pro
grams to provide a firm foundation in fundamentals of
the English language, the effect of this change would
not reach the law schools for several years.

The fact is that law schools will be faced for many
years to come with students who are not properly
trained in the art of expression.
Different law schools have dealt with the problem
in different ways. Some have given an English test
to entering students and have required students who
have fallen below a certain level to take specially pro
vided courses which stress fundamentals of writing.

However, the basic problem is not one of lack of
knowledge of fundamentals. In most .cases the funda
mentals have been learned or can be learned with a
minimum of effort.
The key is in practice and criticism, both criticism
from others and self-criticism. The worst writing ap
pears in examination answers which the student writes
under pressure and with little chance for revision or
editing. If he is compelled, under close supervision, to
review and rewrite his work, he is capable of producing
a mu~b better product.

Many students do not have the opportunity to re
view and re-write under supervision before they reach
law school because many college courses do not re
quire the submission of high-quality written work.
Objective tests are common and papers are seldom
required. Moreover, when such work is required it
is not often subjected to the cold, objective scrutiny
of an instructor before the final draft is prepared.
At William Mitchell, we have wrestled with this prob
lem for some time. We hope that by providing close
personal supervision in the courses in legal writing and
legal drafting we will alleviate the problem by com
pelling the student to review and criticize his own
work and to re-write it again and again.
The use of lawyers as "readers" will immeasurably
strengthen the program in this regard. In addition to
this we are trying to expand the number of small
seminar courses available to students and to require in
those courses high quality written papers.

We hope that these changes will have a salutary
effect on the writing ability of the students in general
and their performance in bar examinations in parti
cular.
Of course no one knows how effective a particular
teaching method will be until it has been in use for
some time and until a representative sample of parti
cipants in the program is available; however, the in
creasing stress on high quality written work makes
it imperative we do our best to require from each
student in each year a representative sample of his
best and most carefully written work.

It is this goal towards which we are striving. Our
program presents special problems in this area because
the key to this approach is time.
As we work with the program each year, changes
will be made and experiments tried, altered, adapted
and abandoned. This will all be done so we will be
able to provide our students with most effective and
practical education possible.
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Wm. Mitchell Students 'Lobby'~ Draft Bills
To Re,v ise Erroneous Minnesota Statutes
By

}AMES ULLYOT

Staff Writer
"In many ways we have been
lobbyists.
"But that description is some
what misleading since we have
represented no special interest
group. Our aim has been for our
bills to pass on their own merits,
not because of any personal gain or
self-interest."
Jack Mitchell (no relation to
William], fourth year student and
chairman of the law improvement
subcommittee, for almost a year
now, has worked on a full-time
basis with the nine other William
Mitchell students in this year's pilot
legislative program.
The committee aims to provide
service to the legal profession in
Minnesota. It helps state legislators
revise ambiguous laws or introduce
new ones.
Mitchell's salary and, for that
matter, the whole program were
largely made possible by a $5,000
grant from the Council on Educa
tion in Professional Responsibility
( affiliated with the American As
sociation of Law Schools). The
nine other members receive $2 each
resear.ch hour, paid by the Minne
sota Senate Law Improvement Sub
committee.

*
Asst. Prof. and state Sen. Jack
Davies, Liberal-District 42, last
spring enlisted volunteers, all third
and fourth year students. The
theory was students could gain
educationaJly from the experience
while also serving a useful function
at relatively little expense to the
legislature.
Third and fourth year students
were chosen because two years of
law school were thought a mini
mum requirement. Mitchell took
an office in the school library.

Aftef helping to form the group,
Davies dissociated himself to re-

MITCHELL'S LOBBYISTS at a posed brainstorming session are from left, front row, Prof. Jack Davies, Tom Strahan, Jack Mitchell, John IDrte, Pat Costelo
and Hugh Plunkett III; back row, William Muske, Janes Lane, Gerald Hartke, James W. Hoolihan and Thomas Spence.

move identification with himself
and his party.
Fourth year students besides
Mitchell are John Hirte, James
Lane III, and Thomas Strahan.
Third year students are Jerrold
Hartke, James Hoolihan, William
Muske Jr., Hugh Plunkett, Thomas
Spence and Rodger Squires.
Last summer the committee faced
its first challenge: to contact legis
lators, lawyers and judges for sug
gested projects. Mitchell made for
mal presentations at the Minnesota
State County Attorneys' Associa
tion and the Minnesota Association
of Municipal Judges. Individuals
were also approached at the State
Bar Association convention. The
"Bench and Bar" state legal jour
nal even published an article soli
citing ideas. Nevertheless, "There
was no great groundswell of re-

sponse," Mitchell said. The lack
of a precedent for the student group
in either the legislature or law
schools in Minnesota contributed
to the slow start.
Besides, 1966 was an off-year for
the legislature.
The biggest boost came after
letters were sent to each member
of the 1965 House and Senate judi
ciary committees. Several useful
ideas for projects and leads to
judges and lawyers resulted. The
program was finally off the ground.
Some suggestions were better
than others. In several instances
extensive research became neces
sary simply to screen the most
practicable and significant projects.
Each student chose one or two key
issues that particularly interested
him. By fall the committee had
about 15 bills slated for the year.

Among these was a bill to extend
service of process to nonresident
individuals. Sen. Wayne Popham,
Conservative-District 35, among
others had recommended the proj
ect. It came as a particularly wel
come challenge to the group be
cause it meant proposing a bill
for a new law rather than for the
revision of an existing statute. Since
the implications for Minnesota pro
cedural law would be far-reaching,
the bill has been the group's most
publicized. Hirte did most of the
research with assistance from
Spence and Mitchell.
(This and most other bills were
introduced and in committee or
passed in only one branch of the
legislature when this story was writ
ten.)
Field interviews, in addition to
library work, kept the research
rigorous and practical. For Muske
interviews to draft a bill to provide
a definition of a "prostitute" took
him into the operations of the Min
neapolis morals squad. In most of
the projects, statutes of other states
and pertinent federal laws were
studied, as well as the 1963 Crimi-

nal Code and various court cases.
The students also considered differ
ent courtroom implications of alter
native bills on the same subject.
Throughout, teamwork keyed
their conduct. The committee often
met as a group and staged self
criticism sessions, hotly debating
issues. The group insisted on unani
mous approval of bills sent to leg
islators and their committees.
When Muske suggested that any
definition of a prostitute would
create more problems than it would
solve, the committee shelved at
tempts to draft a bill.
The decision illustrates the stu
dents' law improvement subcommit
tee's concern that it be judged not
by the quantity but by the quality
of the measures it manages in the
legislature.

*

Drafting individual bills meant
following a uniform style and meet
ing other mechanical requirements.
All bills were submitted to the Re
viser of Statutes Office in the Capi'WBBYISTS'

Continued on Page 5

SATCHEL
Continued from Page I
Prof. Gordon Johnson says the satchel's zipper gave out in 1953 and
the last thread fell off one of the handles in 1961. While he maintains
the satchel is only 33 years old there are those who doubt it. Prof. Green,
for example, considers that "incredible", and Prof. Fitzgerald main
tains the satchel was brought here from the "old country" during the
Nineteenth Century.
Whatever credence one can give these remarks, Dean Heidenreich is
certainly correct when he says "even back in 1957 we didn't think it woold
- make it through the year!"

There is only one explanation why Prof. Gordon Johnson continues to
use the satchel. In his words, "I have, naturally, developed a great attach
ment to it and though it is not a luck charm, I wouldn't feel right without
it."
Why is this story told? We just simply thought you would like to be
aware that this tattered satchel symbolizes 50 years of service to our
school, that it reflects the hard work and devotion of two men who only
remark "we are proud of William Mitchell College of Law and proud
to have been a part of its progress."
(It is interesting to note President Andrew Johnson has never received
pay during his 50 years of service.)

STUDENTS HELP PACK TIME WORN SATCHEIS

From left, James Lethert, Mike LaBaron, Al Vanasek, Lee LaBore and Prof. Gordon Johnson.

So the next time you see the frayed and worn satchel pictured above
with Prof. Gordon Johnson let it remind you William Mitchell College
of Law is a better school because of that worn satchel and because of the
years of service it symbolizes.
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Law 1n Flux: Recovery for Fright
By John Hirte
Fright in literary compositions is a tool an
author strategically employs to stimulate the
emotions of a reader and heighten the effect
of the printed word.

In tort litigation fright caused by negli
gence has frustrated the legal reasoning of a
number of courts who have been called upon
to determine whether it is actionable when
not accompanied by physical impact. In con
sidering this question, New Jersey has re
cently decided that fright is actionable if it
produces substantial injuries or sickness to a
person who was placed in fear of his safety
by the defendant's negligence. The decision
overruled a doctrine that bad prevailed for
sixty five years in New Jersey's case law.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in the
1965 decision of Falzone V. Busch,1 deter
mined that injuries resulting from fright with
out impact should be compensated if the
fright proximately resulted from the defend
ant's negligence. The plaintiff in this case, a
middle aged woman, barely escaped being
struck by the defendant's automobile after it
negligently struck and injured her husband.
The plaintiff alleged that the fright she suf
fered led to a subsequent illness requiring
medical attention, and she sought r,ecovery of
her damages on the grounds the defendan t's
negligence jeopardizing her safety caused her
fright and her illness.
The trial court in granting a summary
judgment for the defendant relied on a doc
trine stated in 1900 by the ew Jersey de
cision of Ward V. West ler.vey & Seashore R.
Co. 2 The Ward decision held that injuries re
sulting from fright were compensable only if
accompanied by physical impact. This de
cision, limited to cases involving negligence,
had been recognized as the rule until Mrs .
Falzone decided to appeal to test the reason
ing of a doctrine which denied her a remedy.

In reconsidering the Ward holding, the
New Jersey court examined the origin of the
"impact" requirement and traced its effect in
New Jersey and in the law of other jurisdic
tions. It reviewed the reasons supporting the
holding and rejected them on the grounds
they were "no longer tenable, and it is ques
tionable if they_ever were." 3
The facts in Ward were similar to those in
the Falzone case. The plaintiff, trapped on a
railroad crossing by the defendant's negli
gence, was not struck by the approaching
train but was so frightened by it that sub
sequent illness resulted. In arriving at the de
termination that "impact" must accompany
the fright to form a cause of action, the New
Jersey court adopted the view expressed in
1888 by the English legal system when the
case of Victorian Railways Commissioners
V. Coultas 4 was decided by the English
Privy Council.
The Coultas case, with facts identical to
those in Ward, was decided in the defendant's
favor when the court unanimously held that
a contemparaneous impact must accompany
the fright to form a cause of action.
The court noted that no prior decisioJ:\
English or American, supported recovery for
fright without impact, and the presiding judge
commented that, "Their Lordships decline to
establish such a precedent."5 The objectionsL
set forth in the opinion were that injuries could
be easily feigned or imagined if no impact was
requil"ed, and also that injuries resulting from
fright could not be considered a consequence
of ordinary negligence. G

The reasoning of the Coultas case was
quickly adopted in the United States and it
was assimilated by the New York Court of
Appeals in 1896 when it decided the case of
Mitchell V. Rochester Ry. Co. 7 The plain
tiff in Mitchell was a pregnant woman who
miscarried when the defendant's team of
hors.es almost ran her over. Medical testi
mony was presented to show that her illness
was the result of the fright she received, but
the court held that impact must accimpany
fright. The court reasoned that fright alone
could not serve as a cause of action, and
therefore a defendant cannot be held re
sponsible for the consequences of the fright. 8
''The nervous disease, blindness or miscar
riage that results from fright merely show the
degree of fright, or the extent of the damages.
The right of action must still depend upon
the question whether a recovery may be had
for fright." 9

About the Author
John Hirte is a senior living in St.
Paul with his wife and two children.
He was graduated from the Univer
sity of Minnesota with a history
major in 1963 and is a Minnesota
state supreme court clerk for Justice
Peterson. He also worked as a
casualty claims adjuster for the St.
Paul Fire-Marine Ins. Co., St. Paul
claims office, for three years.

In denying a cause of action based upon
fright the court reiterated the reasoning ex
pressed by the Eng]j Ii court in Coultas, and
it expressed an additional consideration of its
own. The New York court not only felt that
injuries could be easily feigned without detec
tion, but that any damages would have to rest
upon conjecture or speculation. A "flood of
litigation" would result, and to allow such
fictitious claims "would be contrary to pub
lic policy." 10 The court ruled that a personal
injury must accompany the fright if it is to be
considered, and the court held that damages
from fright alone were too remote to justify
recovery.
With the background set by the Coultas
and Mitchell cases, it is not surprising that
Ward was decided in the defendant's favor by
the New Jersey court. The court said, "Phys
ical suffering is not the probable or natural
consequence of fright, in a person of ordinary
physical and mental vigor. " 11 It ruled that
damages based on fright alone are too re
mote to be compensated. The court decided
that a person should be responsible for the
probable consequences of his negligent acts,
but qualified this by saying a negligent actor
has the right to assume that the persons his
actions might affect would be of "average
strength, both of mind and body." 12

Quoting at length from the Mitchell deci
sion, the New Jersey court repeated the fear
that feigned · or imaginary claims would
"flood" the courts, and it warned that "a wide
field would be opened for unrighteous or
speculative claims." 13 The court stated that
public policy required it to bold such injury
claims were aoaactionable.14
In reacbinit its decision, the Ward court
distinguished -the cases where f ri>?ht accom
panied a personal iniury from those where
fright alone gave rise to an illness or iniury .
The court noted that it was settled by Trac
tion Co. V. Lambertson 15 that a jury was
entitled to consider mental agitation when
fixing damages in cases where physical in
jury was suffered. Fright alone was no cause
of action, reasoned the court in Ward, and it
did not feel that illness resulting subsequent
to the fright should support a recovery. The
court assumed that the state bar members
agreed with its view from the fact that no
similar cause of action had ever come forth
out of "the mass of suits" crowding the court
rooms." 16 This assumption appears to be the
only reason produced by the New Jersey
court to support its decision in Ward.
The Ward decision was construed by the
courts and members of the New Jersey bar
as setting up a requirement that physical im
pact must accompany fright if recovery is
sought. The court, for its own convenience,
denied a remedy it felt would foster fraudu
lent claims. In support of the court's deci
sion, it must be noted that the medical profes
sion at the turn of the century had not pro
gessed to the stage where it could definitely
show a causal connection between fright and
physical effects produced within a body by
fright. In the absence of medical knowledge
to support an attack on the Ward decision,
the New Jersey bar concentrated on attack
ing and reducing the significance of the phys
ical impact requirement.
The case of Tuttle V. Atlantic City R .R. ,17
decided one year after Ward, was the first at
tack on the new requirement of impact. The
plaintiff, a passerby who was frightened when
the defendant's railway car jumped the track
and started toward her, started running . to
escape the peril. Injured when she fell in her

effort to escape, the court allowed her to re
cover for both her fright and the injury. In
justifying this recovery, the court stated:
That if the defendant, by negligence puts the
plaintiff under a reasonable apprehension of
personal physical injury, and plaintiff, in aL
reasonable effort to escape, sustains physical
mjury, a right of action arises to recover for
the physical injury and the mental disorder
naturally incident to its occurence,18

The decision could be interpreted to mean
that fright damages are recoverable without
impact if the frightened party suffers some
physical injury, but sixty-four years were to
elapse before the court so held in the Falzone
case. The Tuttle decision again stated Ward's
view that frigbt alone i not compens.'lble,19
but the Tuttle decision {:reated an eroctiog in
fluence on the impact doctrine.
The court's confidence in the doctrine re
quiring impact is to be seriously questioned
when the case of Porter V. Delaware, L. &
W . R. Co. 20 is considered. This case, decided
six years after Ward, held that dust settling
on a plaintiff's eyes and neck constituted a
sufficient 'impact" to justify recovery for
fright damages. The plaintiff, a pedestrian on
a public highway, was frightened when an ad
jacent railroad bridge collapsed. The plaintiff
alleged she suffered eye and nervous dis
orders from the fright and dust of the crash.
The defendant contended no injury occurred.
The court affirmed the lower court verdict
for the plaintiff, but affirmance was con
ditioned on the reduction of damages
awarded as the evidence did not support the
original damage verdict. The court stated that
Ward precluded damages based solely on
fright, and it distinguished the two cases on
the grounds that Porter had suffered an im
pact (the dust) along with her fright. " (S)he
received physical injuries, and all the result
ant effects to her system, due to the accident,
are recoverable." 21
The "sound" legal principles set forth in

Ward precluding recovery were cast in a dubi
ious position by the legal reasoning that
emerged in the twentieth century. Medical ad
vances, social changes, and new legal concepts
were causing many jurisdictions to reverse
their thoughts on the recovery of damages
based on fright without impact. The earlier
view, expressed in an 1861 case 22 by Lord
Wenselydale, that "mental pain or anxiety the
law cannot value, and does not pretend to
redress when the unlawful act complained of
causes that alone," was being ignored by a
number of courts. They felt mental distress
and the injuries resulting therefrom should be
compensated if they resulted from the defend
ant's negligence.

The expansion of medical knowledge about
emotional dis.t urbance and physical injury
.has been a key factor influenein.ir the courts
to allow recove ry for injurie o; illness re
sulting from fright. The rule requiring impact
was formulated at a time when medical
knowledge was unsettled in its view of the
body relationships. Emotions were held to be
separate from the physical body, and it was
commonly believed that they were distinct in
sofar as interdependent effects were con
cerned.23 Research and practice in the field
of psychosomatic medicine ( dealing with
physical disorders brought on by emotional
distress) has shown that the body and mind
are interdependent, and one medical author
ity has estimated that fifty per cent of illnesses
being treated today are the products of the
emotions. 24 This medical knowledge has
provided evidence that will support a cause
of action, and changing social and legal con
cepts are providing the cause of action.
Modern legal reasoning bas been directed
toward providing a remedy for a wrong
wherever a situation is presented that merits
recovery. In the field of negligence this rea
soning is steadily increasing the amount of
actionable claims, and courts of today are
recognizing that recovery for injuries result
ing from fright alone are proper if a legal
duty owed to the plaintiff is breached by the
defendant's negligent act that produced the
fright. In deciding Falzone V. Busch the New
Jersey Supreme Court joined the majority of
American courts that have adopted this lib
eral view. 25
In adopting the majority view, the New
Jersey court rejected the view that physical
injuries could not be brought on by mental
distress or fright, and it paid heed to the
medical knowledge that bas established that

physical injury or sickness can be the possible
and probable result of fright in some cases. 2R
The court reviewed other state decisions and
the various law review articles supporting a
cause of action for injuries resulting from
fright, and it noted that the Porter case re
duced the impact requirement to "inconse
quential or slight significance. " 2 7
The court dismissed, with little discussion,
the Ward contention that the absence of suits
demonstrated the bar's concurrence with the
rule of no liability. The court merely noted
that "the common law would have atrophied
hundreds of years ago if it had continued to
deny relief in cases of first impression." 2s
Stare decis:,s is of limited application in the
field of torts, declared the court, as stability
and predictability are not as crucial in torts
as they are in contract or property Jaw.29

As few torts are committed in reliance on
an established doctrine the practicality of
this view cannot be denied.
The Falzone court also noted that the
"flood of litigation" feared by the Mitchell
and Ward courts failed to materialize in the
jurisdictions allowing recovery for fright
without impact, and it criticized this reason
on the grounds it denied meritorious relief in
favor of the convenience of the court. The
court commented that an expre ion of the ju
dicial system, and not a decrease in the
availability of justice, was the proper
remedy.so
The ability of the judicial system to see
through the fradulent claims brought before
it was another consideration the New Jersey
court relied on when in abandoned the "im
pact" necessity. The court noted that the trier
of fact may have a somewhat heavier burden
under the new holding, but" . . . a court
should not deny recovery for a type of wrong
which may result in serious harm because
some people may institute fraudulent ac
tions." 31 The existence and extent of in
juries is a matter of proof in any action, and
the emasculated impact necessity was re
garded as a poor method of preventing
fraudulent claims. The difficulty in proving
the automobile "whiplash" injury (an injury
where impact is always present) is con
stantly being met by the courts today, and
when it abandoned the impact requirement
the New Jersey court undoubtably considered
the jury's ability to establish the truth of this.
In answer to Ward's contention that dam
ages would be conjectural and speculative,
it must be remembered that similar damage
situations have existed since 1348 when the
tavern keeper's wife was allowed damages
for the fright she suffered when an irate _
patron swung a hatchet at her. 32 Juries have '
been awarding damages in intentional tort
actions for a long period of time, and they
should encounter little difficulty in assessing
for injuries which result from fright pro
duced by negligence.
Under the Falzone decision, it is necessary
for the plaintiff to show that he suffered
"substantial injury or sickness and that the
injury or sickness was a consequence of the
fright he suffered.33 This burden of proof
should, if it is proved, aid a jury to make
an intelligent assessment of damages.

In rejecting the physical impact require
ment, a requirement which one authority
feels "is almost certainly destined for ulti
mate extinction" ,34 the New Jersey court
noted that case authority cited for support
by the Ward court has been overruled in
past years. Coultas, the English "grand
father" decision relied on by Ward, was over
ruled in 1901 by Dulieu v. White &
Sons.34A New York's Mitchell holding hand
a much longer duration, surviving until 1961 ,
when it was rejected by Batta/av. State. 3 5
By abandoning the impact requirement,
the New Jersey court adopted the viewpoint
that Minnesota courts have followed since
1892 when the case of Purcell v. St. Paul
City Railway 36 was decided. The plaintiff in
this case was a pregnant woman who miscar
ried when the defendant's cable car on which
she was riding narrowly escaped a collision.
The opinion, by Justice Otis, sets forth the
rule:
If the negligence of a carrier places a
passenger in a position of such imminent
peril as to cause fright, and the fright causes
nervous convulsions and illness, the negJi.
gence is the proximate cause of the injury,
FRIGIIT
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Mitchell's 'L·o bbyists'
Continued from Page 3
tol for official acceptance with re
gard to the mechanical details.
A lengthy memorandum accom
panied each bill submitted by the
students. Its purpose was to pro
vide legislators with detailed back
ground on such matters as the
circumstances warranting change,
pertinent cases at law, and possible
future problems which should be
questioned. Discussion of pros and
cons minimized bias in each mem
orandum and helped legislators see
many sides of an issue.
In many ways, the memoranda
represent one of the most impor
tant aspects of the work of the law
improvement subcommittee.
They were not required. (Lobby
ists rarely submit them with bills
they draft.) Moreover, the memo
randa called for a lot of extra work.
But thoroughness set a high stand
ard for the researchers and as
sured a rewarding personal experi
ence while increasing chances of
a bill's acceptance.
Rep. Joseph T. O'Neill, Conser
vative-District 47B, a member of
the House judiciary committee, in
troduced a bill worked on by Muske
to permit county treasurers to ac
cept negotiable paper in lieu of
cash for taxes.
In an interview, O'Neill noted,
"Muske and Mitchell did a real fine
job with a real complex problem.
Their research and especially the
memorandum they gave us were
excellent and very helpful." He said
he hopes the program will be con
tinued in future years.
Selecting legislators like O'Neill
to "author" (introduce and pro
mote) the bills has hardly been a
simple matter. The students have
carefully chosen a variety of legis
lators to avoid identification with
particular individuals or parties. A
certain amount of selling has been
required to enlist a prospective au
thor's support. It has been neces
sary to reach numerous legislators
each time since a bill is usually in
troduced by principal and at least
two co-authors in each legislative
branch.
It has been important to select
legislators who are members of
either the House or Senate com
mittee where the bills predictably
will be referred for hearings after
initial introduction.
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Finally, for each bill the students worked hard and done an outstand
have paid some attention to having ing job."
two Conservatives and one Liberal
Mitchell added he and the others
in each branch for greater chances had gained immense respect for
of success in the Conservative do the legislators. "Most people have
minated legislature.
no idea how busy, how thorough
"Selecting authors for our bills and yet how efficient and produc
has been a very strategic matter," tive they are."
Mitchell added.
Because the legislature will not
Mitchell and the students work meet next year, there will be no
ing on each bill have been appear law improvement subcommittee un
ing at the numerous committee til possibly the summer of 1968.
hearings, presenting bills and an Two key questions: whether an
swering questions. Sometimes this other will be formed at that time,
has meant as many as six appear and if so, whether the commitee
ances for a particular bill.
will be expanded to include Uni
(The state legislature meets for versity of Minnesota law students?
120 days every other (odd-num
These judgments and others will
bered) year. Nearly 2,000 bills will be made later with the help of a
have been introduced in each comprehensive summary including
branch during this session ending recommendations to be assembled
May 22.)
by the students after exams.
As the final day grows nearer,
Mitchell points out that "one of
the pace of activity quickens and our aims has been to lay the
an increasing number of bills re groundwork and make it a little
turn from committee for final easier for future committees."
House or Senate action. So, too,
In general, "I think we have
the law improvement subcommit been able to show the legislature
tee's bills will move more rapidly that our function is worthwhile,"
in the last month.
Mitchell said.
Bills in addition to those already
"All of us are grateful for this
mentioned include (student re greatly educational experience of
searcher's name in parenthesis) : a seeing how bills became enacted
bill to repeal the state law prohibit into laws," he added.
ing campaigning on election day,
to be consistent with the recent
Mills v. Alabama U.S. Supreme
Court decision (Hoolihan); two
bills to make statutes conform to
the 1963 Criminal Code (Squires);
and a bill to amend the statute re
garding the reporting of cases of
Alpha Epsilon Psi Chapter of the
child abuse (Strahan).
Phi Delta Delta legal fraternity
Others include bills amending entertained women law students
statutes relating first to prohibitions and practicing women attorneys at
of double prosecutions and second an afternoon April 1 tea in the
to fees charges for foreclosures of ladies' lounge of the Campus Club,
mortgages (Plunkett); a bill to University of Minnesota.
amend the statute relating to fees
Rita Lukes and Doris Huspeni
charged for publication of legal were student guests from William
notices (Hartke); a bill to resolve Mitchell.
an ambiguity in the statute regard
Jean J. McVetty, practicing at
ing annexations without a hearing torney from Minneapolis, spoke
before the Municipal Commission briefly about the organization's pur
(Lane); and a bill to establish to pose.
Violet Sollie, president, Olga
absolute effect the various types of
resolutions passed by the legisla Garthur and Eleanor Kestermann
were co-hostesses.
ture (Spence) .
Members of the fraternity at
Looking back over the year,
Mitchell praised the other members William Mitchell include Ellen
of the committee for their devoted Dressehius and Dorothy Juene
efforts and thoughtful work. "These mann. Rosalie Wahl, who recently
guys~not I-should be given the completed graduation requirements,
credit," he said. "They have really is also a member.

Women's 'frat'
Meets At 'U'

Unmasking of Informer
Fails Constitutionally
By Robert Ahl
Following a tip from an unidentified informer, George McCray was
arrested and indicted in Chicago for possession of narcotics.
McCray was granted a hearing to consider his demands for suppression
of the obtained evidence. At that hearing, both arresting officers testified
as to the reliability of the informer and, subsequently, the motion to sup
press was denied. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider McCray's claim
that the evidence was acquired via an unconstitutional search and seizure.
The Court denied the petitioner's claim and held: neither the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Sixth Amendment required
the police to disclose the name of the informer when the issue of probable
cause was at issue. McCray v. Illinois, 35 U. S. L. W. 4261 (U .S. March
20, 1967).
The informer's privilege is, in reality, the privilege of the government to
withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of crime.!

Prior to McCray, the status of the informers privilege had been deter
mined on evidentiary rather than constitutional grounds. It is hardly sur
prising, therefore, to find considerable variation in the application of the
privilege. The decisions fall into two broad categories: either the absolute
recognition of the privilege, or the recognition of the privilege subject to
certain exceptions and limitations.
Some early federal cases, proceeded on the theory that the privilege of
nondisclosure is absolute in a situation where the legality (probable cause)
of an arrest or search without a warrant is an issue. In Segurola v. United
States, 2 the court held that refusal to require a police officer on cross
examination to give the name of the person from- whom he obtained in
formation leading to the search was not prejudicial. Another example of the
absolute privilege in the federal courts is Mclnes v. United States,3 a pro
secution for possession and transportation of intoxicating liquor in viola
tion of the National Prohibition Act. The defendant was arrested after
the officer found liquor in his car. The court did not require that the name
of the informant be disclosed, the rule being that sound public policy for
bids exposing informers to possible evil consequences.
The informers privilege, at present, appears to be absolute in Texas. In
Bridges v. State, 4 the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals held that an of
ficer is not required to reveal the name of the person from whom he re
ceives information upon which he bases his right to arrest or search
upon probable cause. Subsequent Texas cases accepted the rule enunciated
in Bridges as absolute.5
By the weight of authority, however, it is recognized that the privilege
of non-disclosure of an informer's identity is subject to exceptions and
limrtations. In the federal jurisdiction, it has been slowly recognized that
the fundamental requirements of fairness may require disclosure.
L

In United States v. Blich, 6 the federal district court decided officers
making searches and seizures of automobiles for transportation of liquor
without a warrant must, to establish probable cause, describe every ele
ment of the case: "This rule reasonably includes the source of their in
formation, so that the court may determine whether, under all circum
stances, a case of probable cause has been established." 7
Scher v. United Slates, 8 added the execption that when the identity of
the informant is essential to the defense as, for example, where this turns
upon an officer's good faith, the general rule forbidding such disclosure
will be abrogated.
fu the extremely important decision o f Roviaro v . Uniied States, 9 the
question of the informer participant was dealt wi th. In this case, the
Supreme Court beld that the lower court bad committed reversible error
INFORMER

Continued on Page 6

FRIGHT
Continued from Page 3
and the injury is one for which an action
may be brought.37

The court's syllabus also stated that the in
jured party is entitled to recover the full
extent of his damages without regard to his
prior physical condition.38 These views are
similar to those of the 1965 Falzone de
cision.
It is interesting to note that the Minnesota
court had little difficulty in determining that
fright could produce physical injuries. The
Purcell court stated:
The body and mind operate reciprocally
on each other. Physical injury or illness
sometimes causes mental disease, a mental
shock or disturbance sometimes causes in
jury or illness of body, especially the nervous
system.39

This is the relationship that had given the
Ward court some difficulty before it deter
mined that "physical suffering is not the prob
able or natural result of fright." 4 Falone v.
Busch changed this outloot, and both Minne
sota and New Jersey now agree that in
juries or sickness resulting from fright with-

°

~45 N."J. 559, 14A.2d 12 (1965 ) .
• 65 NJ.L. 383. 47A.S6t (1900).
• 4'.> J . ar 561, 214A.2d at H .
• l 3 AP,J>. Cas. 1.22 ( 1888,J .
• ld: :lt 226.
• !hid.
• 1Sl .Y. 107, 45 N .E. 3S4. (1896 ) .
• [bid.
0 Jb/d.
,o l'd.. at 108, <t5 N . E. at 355.
u 65 N.J.L at 384. 47A.2d at 562.
"' ibid.
1II

{bid.

out impact are compensable if the plaintiff
was placed into a position where he had
reasonable fear for his safety.
Recovery for fright alone has never been
allowed in Minnesota or New Jersey in un
intentional tort cases. The necessity of a re
sulting injury or sickness has been steadilly
insisted upon, and the remaining American
courts agree on this requirement.

Purcell, 41

Minnesota expressed this view in
and it was recently reiterated in the case of
State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Village of
Isle. 42 New Jersey, because of Ward's re
quirement of physical impact, expressed this
view in 1900, and the rule still stands under
the Falzone decision. New Jersey, by the rea
soning of Falone, still requires substantial
injury or sickness for the plaintiff to recover.
Minnesota and New Jersey also concur
today in their treatment of actions based on
the plaintiff's fright at seeing a third person
injured through a defendant's negligence.
Both states hold that no cause of action
exists for recovery of such damages. New
Jersey established its view by the Ward deHibid.

1• 60 N.J.L. 457, 38A.684 (1897).

10 65 N.J.L. at 384, 47A. at 562.
1766 N.J.L. 327, 49A.450 (1901).
1s Id. at 328 49A. at 451.
rn Ibid.
20 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906).
,,_ Ibid.
""Lynch V. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 557 (1861)
"'Anno!., 64 A.LR. 2d 103 (1951).
"' Heron, Psychology and You, 202 ( 1959).
"" Prosser, Torts§ 37, 177 (2nd. Ed., 1955).
"'45 N.J. at 561 214A.2d at 14.

cision's impact requirement, and this view
has been continued by Falzone's holding
that the plaintiff has to be put in fear of his
safety by the defendant's negligence. Min
nesota, in the 1902 decision of Sanderson V.
Northern Pacific R. Co., 44 held that
"there
results
fright
wrong

can be no recovery for
in physical injuries . .
is the proximate result
against the plaintiff by

fright which
. unless the
of a legal
the defend

ant."45
This view is adhered to by the majority of
the American courts today.46
One of the arguments often presented
against the abandonment of the "impact"
requirement is the possibility of vexations
litigation where the defendant is unaware of
the alleged incident involving fright. The
New Jersey court recognized this problem,
and felt this consideration should not be
sufficient to bar a meritorious claim. The
court stated that the trial judge should
exercise his discretion in this respect and
charge the jury that an undue delay in notify
ing the defendant of the incident may weigh
"'Id. at 562, 214A.2d at 15.
28 Ibid.
Id. at 564, 214A.2d at 17.
Id. at 563, 214A.2d at 16.
31 Ibid.
""I de S et. ux. V. W de S, Y.B. 22 Edw. III, F.
99, Pl. 60 (1348).
:i., 45 N.J. at 564, 214A.2d at 17.
34 Prosser, Torts § 55, 351 (3rd Ed. 1964).
34A 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
""10 N.Y. 2d 237, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 34, 176 N.E. 2d 729
(1961).
""48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892).
20
30

heavily in determining the truth of the
plaintiff's claim. 4 7 This fear is a present and
alarming one, and the most reasonable
remedy against it is the strict enforcement
of the rule requiring the plaintiff to prove
his case by a fair preponderance of the evi
dence.
The doctrine requiring physical impact has
fallen into a minority position that is wither
ing rapidly.

New Jersey has recognized this by the Fal
one decision, and a cause of action once
denied on the grounds of "public policy" has
now come into existence by the dictates of
modern "public policy." It is conceivable
that future cases will allow recovery for
fright. alone in negligence cases, and many
states are reconsidering their denials of the
action based on the fright the plaintiff suf
feres when a third person's life is endan
gered by the defendant's negligence. It may
take some time to change the present view
points, but, in the words of the New Jersey
court. "The rule of stare decisions is limited in
the field of torts. "48
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
40 65 N.J.L. at 384, 4 A. at 562.
41 48 Minn. at 134, 50 N. W. at 1034.
'"265 Minn. 360, 122 N. W. 2d 36 (1963) .
43 45 N.J. at 564, 214 A.2d at 17 .
44 88 Minn. 162, 92 N. W. 542 (1902).
45 Jbid.
"'Prosser, Torts § 37, 176 (2nd Ed. 1955) .
47 45 N.J. at 564, 214 A.2d at 17.
48 Id. at 559, 214 A.2d at 12.

37
38
31)

Page 6

Harrison to Speak -After receiving his LLB. and
being admitted to the Minnesota
Bar, he returned to North Dakota
where he was admitted to the bar
of that state and practiced in Minot
until 1928.
He then went to Glasgow, Mon
tana, where he was court reporter
from 1929 until 1938; he was then
admitted to the Montana Bar in
1930.
From 1938 until 1957 he prac
ticed in Malta, Montana, during
which he served as city attorney
of Malta 1940-48, county attorney
of Phillips County, Montana, 194852 and as chairman of the Montana
State Board of Pardons 1955-56.
In 1957 he was elected Chief
Justice of the Montana Supreme
Court and has been re-elected twice
since then, the last time without
opposition.
Chief Justice Harrison has an
honorary degree from the Montana
School of Mines and is a member
of the Masons. He has three chil
dren, one of whom is presently
living in Minneapolis.
In an interview with Chief Jus
tice Harrison he mentioned that he
had the opportunity to visit Wil
liam Mitchell in the fall of 1965,
he referred to it as "a beautiful

CRAIG GAGNON
Staff Writer
The William Mitchell Law Wives,
with a paid ;membership of 110,
held their last meeting of the
year May 3, concluding by far the
most successful year in their short
history.
Thanks to a good group of hard
working, enthusiastic wives, more
scholarships than ever before will
be awarded by the Law Wives.
Our major fund raising project,
the sale of "La Petite Slurps", furry
little heads with big eyes, was a
much greater success than we had
imagined. Mrs. Dennis Letourneau,
in charge of the project, reports
that the total amount raised was
$1,660.
Two fund raising events were
held; the dance in December, at
which we raised $300, and the style
show, also at the Thunderbird MoMRS.

C·rime, Courts & the Informer

Continued from Page 1

school" and "a far cry from what
we went through."
He sees the night law school as
having a mission of definite im
portance, one which is more vital
today than ever before. The Chief
Justice pointed out that had it not
been for the evening law school he
would never have been able to have
earned his law degree.
Candidates for degrees are:
Bruce L Anderson , Charles W .
Anderson, James J. Boyd, Joseph
E. Cartwright, Robert W. Casey,
Bruce W. Christopherson, Richard
J. Chrysler, Clement J. Commers,
James E. Conway (LLB.), Keith
B. Davis, Sylvester F. Doffing
(LLB.), Ellen Dresselhuis, Den
nis L Ehlers, Clyde E. Eklund,
Ronald E. Erickson, Lee L. Fos
sum.
Robert J. Goggins, Webster A.
Hart, Duane R. Harves, Kenneth
G. Heimbach, Jr., John D. Hirte,
Anthony W. Karambelas, James R.
Keating, Frederick W. Keiser, Jr.,
Calvin J. Krebs, James S. Lane III,
David S. McClung, John C. Mc
Laughlin, Patrick M. McShane.
William T. Malchow, Richard J.
Marchek, Jack A . Mitchell , Patrick
D. Moren, Robert E . Mountain,
Richard M. Olson (LLB.), Rich
ard R. O'Reskie.
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David L Peterson, James A.
Phillips, John E. Regan, Kaye S.
Reishus, Thomas P. Schiltz, Craig
E. Scholle (LLB.) , David J. Sime
cek, Thomas W. Strahan, James
P. Sundquist, Charles M. Tilden,
Edward C. Tischleder (L.L.B.)
Gerald M . Tyler, Rosalie E. Wahl,
Bradley L Winch.

Approach to Legal
Writing Endorsed
A new approach to the third year
legal writing course, adopted this
semester, will continue in 1967-68.
Coordinated by Larry Perlman,
Harvard Law school graduate who
is associated with the Minneapolis
firm of Wheeler and Frederickson,
the class meets formally only four
or five times a semester.
The remainder of instruction is
given flexibly in small groups
which meet with Perlman and five
other Twin City attorneys who
have had extensive legal writing
experience.
A total of five or six assignments
are given during the semester, cov
ering such areas as appellate brief
writing, letters to clients etc.

~aahion
tel, held in March. With the help
of many creative and ambitious
law wives, Mrs. Bruce Nemer, the
chairman, did a most commendable
job of making this an enjoyable
afternoon. 409 law wives and
friends attended the luncheon and
show put on by Young Quinlan
Rothchild, with Mrs. Florence Lie
mandt, their fashion coordinator,
commenting on garments modeled
by law wives.
We made about $150 on this
event.
Next year 10 $200 scholarships
will be awarded to husbands of law
wives who have paid their dues.
This year eight students received
$200 scholarships from last year's
law wives group.
Each year the Law Wives under
take a charity project. This year
we made a $25 donation to the

Home of the Good Shepherd m
St. Paul.

*

Senior Award Night is June 9.
Mrs. Gerald Regnier is in charge
of arrangements. This event is part
of the commencement activities and
is put on by the junior wives for
the seniors, their wives and parents.
Election of new officers for next
year will be held at the May meet
ing. This will be preceded by a
pot luck supper, a somewhat tradi
tional event started when we were
compiling recipes for the Law
Wives Cookbook two years ago.
Mrs. Clem Commers deserves
commendation for enlisting speak
ers to entertain, inform, and/ or
demonstrate at each meeting.
Also, Mrs. Keith Hanzel did an
excellent job on securing juries for
each Moot Court.

Continued from Page 5
by permitting the government to withhold disclosure of the identity of the
informer when the informer was an active participant in the crime and the
guilt or innocence of the defendant was at stake. However, the court's
language in Roviaro seemed to indicate that disclosure may not be limited
to those cases where the informer is a participant: "Whether a proper
balance renders non-disclosure erroneous must depend upon the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged,
the possible defense, the possible significance of the informer's testimony
and other relevant factors. "10 The language tends to indicate that the
fact that the informer is a participant in the crime charged would be only
one relevant factor, and disclosure would be required where the informer
did not actually participate if "the contents of his communication are
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or are essential to a
fair determination of the cause." 11 It should be noted here that while
the McCray opinion limits Roviaro on other very important grounds, it
does not limit it to a participating informer. This should further dilute an
already weak distinction between participating and non-participating in
formers.
The Supreme Court in Roviaro, although not dealing with a probable
cause issue, indicated that under certain circumstances disclosure of the
informer's identity in this area is required. After Roviaro, most of the
federal circuit courts applied the dictum, holding it to be reversible error
if the name of the alleged informant, upon whose tip probable c ause for
the defendant's arrest was based, was not divulged. 12 The dictum was also
applied in some important state decisions. 13
It is on this point that the McCray opinion limits Roviaro : "The Roviaro
case involved the informer's privilege, not at a preliminary hearing to
determine probable cause for an arrest or search, but at the trial itself
where the issue was the fundamental one of innocence or guilt. . . .
What Roviaro thus makes clear is that this court was unwilling to impose
any absolute rule requiring disclosure of an informant's identity
formulating evidentiary rules for federal criminllll trials. Much Jess
court ever approached the formulation of a federal evidentiary
compulsory disclosure where the issue is the preliminary one of
cause, and guilt or innocence is not at stake." H

even in
has the
rule of
proable

The impact that the above language will have on the federal courts is
uncertain. It remains to be seen how many, if any, of the federal circuits
r equiring identity of the informer in determining probable cause will alter
their positions in light of McCray.
The most significant aspect of McCray is its determination of the con
stitutional question regarding the informer's privilege. Here the court
relies heavily on the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court as ex
pressed by Chief Justice Weintraub in State v. Burnett: "We must remem
ber that we are not dealing with the trial of the criminal charge itself.
There the need for a truthful verdict outweighs society's need for the
informer privilege. The Fourth Amendment is served if a judicial mind
passes upon the existence of probable cause. . . . If the magistrate doubts
the credibility of the affiant, he may require that the informant be identified
or even produced. . . . It should rest with the judge who hears the motion
to suppress to decide whether he needs disclosure in order to decide
whether the officer is a believable witness." 1;;
Thus, the effect of 11-fcCray on the state courts seem predictable. They are
left free to formulate rules of evidence regarding probable cause, at least
subject to the exception tha t all of the circumstances, including tbe good
faith belief of the officers in the informant' reliability be divulged for
judicial determination. Whether McCray will be extended to include re
cognition of the informer's privilege, as qualified above, when guilt or
innocence at trial is the issue, is left undetermined. In an attack on a state
conviction, following a trial in which disclosure was denied, the Supreme
Court might hold the denial of the informant's identity to be so unfair
as to violate the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair
trial.
Also left unanswered to whether the absolute informer's privilege, as
applied by the Texas courts, 16 would stand the test of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The most probable result is that the majority of courts, both state and
federal, rather than adhering to any rigid formula, will take each case as it
comes, balancing the defendant's right in each against the government's
interest in concealing the informant's identity.
Items to be weighed will include the nature of the crime as well as the
nature of the defense, the credibility of the affiant, and the possible
significance of the informant's testimony. This flexible approach is the
most persuasive as it takes proper recognition of the public's legitimate
interest in e~ective l aw enforcement without significant diminution of the
Fourth Amendment.
McCray Y. IUl.noiS, 35 U.S.L. W. 4261 (U. s. Mar. -w. 1967) .
~:c eray v. llllnois, 33 111 . 2d 66, 2l0 N.E. 2d. 161 (I 65) .
People v, Durr, 28 JU. 2d. OS. 192 ~ .:E.. 2d 379 (196 ).
35 U. S.L.W. 4261 (V. S. Mar. 20. 1967).
1 Ro vfa.ro v. United States, 353 U. S. 5459 (1.957 ,
'Segurola v. United Stales, 275 U. S. 106 (1927).
• Mcl:nes v. United States, 62.F. 2d 180 (1932) . .
• Bridges v. Si3ce. l66 Tex. C:tlm. 566, 316 W 2d 7S7 ( 1958 ).
" Arredondo Y . State, 168 T ex.. Crim. 110, 324 SW 2d 217 (1959).
• united States v. Bliah, 45 F. 2d 627 ( D. Wyo. 1930).
' Id. at 629.
s Scher v. U nited States, 305 U . S. 251 (1938 ) .
"Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
lQ [ d. Ol 62.
11 Id. at 60.
" Gunerman, The Info rmer Priri/ege, 58 J. Crim. L. C. & P . S. 32. 42 & n. 85 (1967).
•• Priestly v. Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco, 50 Cal 2d 812, 330 P 2d
39 ( 1958).
H JS U .S.L. \ . 4261, 4263 (U.S. Mnr. 20, 1967).
State v, B11rnea 42 N.J. 377, 201 A 2d 39 (1964).
" 35 U.S.'L.W. 4261. 4263 U.S. Mar. 20, 1%7 ).
'"Bridges v. S tate. 166 T e><. Crim. 566, 316 S.W. 2d 757 (1958) .

ABA Ag,ainst Electoral College
Major actions of the American
Bar Association's House of dele
gates at its midyear February meet
ing in Houston included:

PLAYING THE FASHION GAME as models for the law wives fashion show-luncheon from left are Mrs. John
Jacobson and Mrs. Julius Gemes, both of Roseville.

Endorsement, by a three to one
vote, of an ABA Commission's
proposal to abolish the electoral
college and elect the nation's pres-

ident and vice president by direct
popular vote.
Authorization of a special com
mittee to study and recommend re
forms in bar discipline.
Referral for further study of a
proposal for congressional limits
on state and local government pow
ers to tax interstate commerce.
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Mitchell N,o Longer 'Visitor'
To ALSA Circuit Conference
By CRAIG w. GAGNON
Staff Writer
Thanks to the five-man William
Mitchell delegation to the March
17-18 American Law Student As
sociation, Eighth Circuit Conven
tion in Columbia, Missouri, Mitch
ell is no longer "just a visitor to
ALSA conferences."
That's what G. Richard Fox,
president of ALSA, wrote Dean
Douglas R. Heidenreich after Bill
Sommerness was narrowly defeated
for national vice-president on the
sixth ballot.
"This alone attests to tire im
pression on the William Mitchell
delegation gave the other voting
delegates," said Fox.

"Those of us who backed and
voted for Bill were impressed not
only by his winning personality but
also by his obvious desire and the
desire of all your delegates to in
volve William Mitchell in circuit
affairs," he added.
The convention topic was "Civil
Disobedience" and featured Geor
gia legislator, Julian Bond, at its
keynote speaker.
The Mitchell delegation in
duded Web Hart, Sommerness,
Clem Commers, Jim Sundquist,
and Jerry Holmay. Sommerness,
Hart and Commers presented a
panel discussion on night law
schools.

Regans?WouldYou
Believe 4 of Them?
John Regan, a William Mitchell
senior, represents the third gener
ation in his family to attend the St.
Paul and William Mitchell colleges
of law.
He is the third John Regan and
the fourth family member in a se
quence by his grandfather, John
Regan, a 1907 graduate of the St.
Paul College of Law.
His uncle, John Regan, and his
father, Robert Regan, represented
the second generation as 1932 and
1933 graduates, respectively.
The family tradition may con
tinue next year with the enrollment
of Michael Regan, brother of John
'67, who has applied for admission.
Robert Regan serves on the board
of governors of the Minnesota Bar
Association. He practices in the
same law firm in Mankato his father
started in 1910, now Regan, Regan
and Kroon.

~--

ALSA is holding its national con
vention in Hawaii this year. Hart
indicates that present S.B.A. plans
include sending a William Mitchell
representative to this convention,
also.

*

The S.B.A. sponsored a trip to
the Stillwater state prison in Feb
ruary; 35 students braved some
miserable weather to make the tour
but there was general agreement
the trip was well worth it.

The chief prison psychologist and
chief guard escorted the group
through the prison and frankly dis
cussed various aspects of prison
problems in response to student
questioning at the completion of
the tour.
Web Hart, S.B.A. president, felt
the trip was a valuable educational
experience and plans are being
made for more trips of this nature

in the future.

*

An historic "first annual second
semester smoker" was also spon
sored by the S.B.A . A large num~
ber of instructors and students
turned out for the beer, dogs and
chips event. Hart said the smoker
should be carried forward as an
annual event because of the greater
opportunity it gives the students to
get to know their insructors. Hart
indicated "the smoker accom
plished this objective very well ."
Hart pointed out that part of
the reason the S.B.A. has been able
to enlarge the scope of its activi
ties has been because of the addi
tional revenue created by the new
canteen equipment that the S.B.A.
installed in the smoking lounge. A
portion of the profits go to the
S.B.A.

56 Brothers Brave Cold To
Hear Justice Tom Clark
Fifty-six brothers representing
the six chapters in District V braved
sub-zero cold to attend the recent
Conclave held in Minneapolis Feb
ruary 24-25.
James Tuzinski, student district
justice and co-chairman of the Con
clave said that this was a record
turnout for a district Conclave in
this area.
Hosts, Pierce Butler Chapter
from William Mitchell with 30 at
tending led the way, followed by
Corliss Chapter from the University
of North Dakota, Grand Forks
with 14.
A smoker for all of the brothers
in attendance got things started Fri
day evening. Saturday was devoted
to a full schedule of speeches, chap
ter reports, and workshops. Butler
Chapter put on a pre-breakfast
model initiation, as they initiated
two new active members, Thomas
O'Meara and Roger Squires. Break
fast speakers were Dean Douglas
R. Heidenreich, who spoke on "The
Law School and Phi Alpha Delta"
and Keith M . Stidd, Minneapolis
city attorney who spoke on "The
Lawyer in Municipal Government. "
The highlight of the Conclave
was a telephone call address from
Brother Tom C. Clark, Justice of
the U. S. Supreme Court and Su
preme Vice Justice of PAD. lntr~

duced by Supreme Justice Robert
Redding, Justice Clark congratu
lated the brothers in attendance
for their fine tum out and then
deftly fielded a question regarding
recent decisions in the criminal law
area posed by Brother Lee LaBore
of Butler Chapter.

Judge Leslie L. Anderson, of the
Minnesota District Court spoke to
the delegates at lunch on the topic
"Federal Court Problems and State
Court Relationships to Them." At
the afternoon session the delegates
voted to hold the 1968 District V
Conclave in Des Moines, Iowa with
Cole Chapter at Drake University
as host Chapter.
New student district officers
were elected with installation at
the evening banquet. The new offi
cers are: Robert Alvine, Cole Chap
ter, justice; Don Bell, Hammond
Chapter, vice justice; James Lethert,
Butler Chapter, clerk; Don Neiman,
Cole Chapter, treasurer; Gene An
derson, Corliss Chapter, marshall.
Pierce Butler Chapter which
planned and arranged for the Con
clave was led by brothers: James
J . Tuzinski and John S. Monroe,
Jr. , co-chairmen; Paul W. Buegler,
program; Craig W. Gagnon, alum
ni; James M . Riley, arrangements;
Thomas P. Kane, finance; Don I.
Bryme, publicity; and Larry Jor
genson, chapter contact.
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Work Com·p Quandary
Resolved By Court
It is not uncommon for a condition of permanent partial disability to
progress to a state where it becomes total incapacity. In the field of Work
men's Compensation this raises a significant question: Should a prior
award for permanent partial disability be credited against a later award
for permanent total disability?
The Minnesota Supreme Court was first confronted with this question in
Durant v . Butler Brothers.1 The court ruled that an award for permanent
partial disability cannot be credited against a later award for permanent
total disability where it is not established that the payments overlapped.
Some state legislatures have specifically provided that a prior award for per
manent partial disability must be credited against a later award for permanent
partial disability must be credited against a later award for permanent total
disability 2 while other state legislatnre.s have taken th.e opposite vie v.3 The
Minnesota legislature has expressed no view on the question, unless its silence
can be construed as nonacquiescence in the credit. 4

Rather than straining the limits of judicial construction to find some
legislative intent in the conspicious absence of any provision allowing the
type of credit that was sought in Durant, the court determined that the
"Minnesota legi, lature has left open the question of crediting prior com
pensation awards against a subsequent award for permanent total dis
ability * * *]." 5
With a few exceptions,5 the general rule in most jurisdictions is that a prior
compensation award will not be credited against a later award for a change of
condition unless the awards overlap.7

In State Highway Dept. v. Crossland ll a later award for permanent
partial disability overlapped an earlier award for temporary total disability.
T he Oklahoma court r emanded the case and.held that it was unauthorized
duplication to grant, "compensation for total disability for a period which
overlapped, or began before the end of the period for which such maximum
compensation was awarded." 9
The rule adopted in Durant is very similar to the holding in Crossland.
The Minnesota court held that:
"Rather than crediting all compensation benefits pre
viously paid against compensation pay able under a sub
sequent award based on a change of condition * * * only
the overlapping compensation payments should in any
event be credited under the present provisions of the Work
men's Compensation Act." 10

The schedule of payments in the Minnesota Workmen's
Compensation Acl 11 provides compensation ba ed on a percentage of
rhe employee pre-injury wage which is paid o ver a specified number of
weeks. The court's decision in Durant finds support in the view that the
weekly compensation payments under these anatomical schedules are re
lated to loss of earning capacity.
Another approach which has gain ed support is that the right to com
pensation for permanent partial disability to a specific member of the body
is mea ured by the extent o the injury without considering the degi;ee of
disability or the extent of incapacity.12 ln Beane v. Vermont Marble Co.::i~
the Vermont coun indicated that compensation for scheduled inj'uries
are fixed by the schedule of payments and went on to state that:
"[R]ecovery may be had without regard to the fact
that the wages of the injured employee are the same
as, or higher than, they were prior to the injury. The
same rule applies in cases where ·the usefulness of a
member is permanently impaired although not entirely
lost." 14
The payment of compensation for a scheduled injury is based on a con
clusive presumption of loss of earning ca pacify rather than the injured
employee's actual wage-loss experience. 1 5
T he significant fac.tor is that'Pennaneot disability partial or total is based
on a ptesumption th!lt it wiU last for tl1e life of the empJoyee. A change of
condition from a state o·f permanent partial disability to permanent- tota l
disability indicates that the partial disability was merely an inteD!lediate
rather than permanent condition. Compensation based on permanent disa
bility is cxc~ve if the disnbili ty is only inter:mediate.

An employer who fully .c ompensates an employee for permanent partial
di ability would receive a credit where the employee is subsequently found
to be permanently totally disabled as a result of the same accident The
employee would be aUowed to retain a percentage of the fust award rep
r ented by the period of time he was partially disabled divided by his
life expectancy m ea u.red [rom the date that he was found to have become
permanently partiaJJy disabled . The b·a lance of the first award would be
credi ted against the ubseq uent award for p ermanen t total. disabil.ity. 1 0
' 148 N. W. ,!d 1.52 ( M inn . 1967 .
~ I daho Code.§ 72-310(c) (1961) provides tlun, "Jn case lhe total disability begins after :i
penod of partinf disability, lhc pei,od of partial disabllity shnll be dedm,1ed from such.
total pc.clod of 400 w..ek~."
" F1a. Stn t. § 440.2 ( 1955) provides that where a prior award or compens~tlon ls i!r
creased or decreased, ·• uch new order shall not affec t any comprn. nt,on previously- p:ud
* 4* * "
See. L eisy v. Hardin, 135 U .S. 100 (1890).
• Jd. ut L56.
,, ee. c.u .. Endieou v. Potlutcb Pore,,t • lnc. 69 !clllho 4.50, 208 P . 2d 803 ( 1949) ; hield,
prior awards mu,t be d educted wl!hoat regard tQ whether lhey overlapped the later award.
See, also, McCall v. Potla tch 'forests, Inc. 69 Idaho 4;10. 208 P. 2d 799 (1949 ) . The resull
in Endlcofl is predicated upon lhe requirement of Tdaho Code. § 72·310 (c) (1961), supra,
OO!C 4.

I

0
ee D unla p ,·. State Compensa tion Director, 149 W. a. 266. 140 S. E. 2d 448 (1965) ;
'Phelps Dodge Corp., Copper Qu.e en Branch, v. [ndastrial Comm .. J Arli. App. 70, 399 P .
2d 691 (196.S) Smitty's Coffee Shop v. Florida Jn dustrial Comm. 86 So. 2d 268 (Fla. l965) .
Sm!uy's Coffee bop v . .Florida. Industrial Comm. 86 o. 2a 268 (f1a. 1965) .
8 391 P . 2d 801 (Okla. 1964 ) .
•Id. at 807.
1 0 148 N . W . 2d at 157.
11 Supra note 14.
12 See 2 La rson, Workm en's Co mpensation L aw. § 57.10 at 3 (1961 ed .); 11 Schneider,
Workmen's Compensation Text , § 2322 at 565 ( perm. ed.) .
1a 115 Vt. 142, 52 A . 2d 784 (1947).
u I d. at 144, 52 A. 2d a t 7 4 .
"See 2 Larson, op. cit. supra, note 17, § 58.1 0 at 43.
10 With all due deferlll\CC to the human qualities of the law, this rule may be expressed.
as an algebr aic equation for the purpose of clarity. Assuming that :
x
period of time elapsed between the finding of permanent partial disability and the
finding of permane total disability.
y
life expectancy of the employee from the date he is found to have become per
manently parthill}" disabled.
a
total amount of compensation under the first award.
b
tota l amount of compensation the employee· is entitled to under the firs t award.
Thus :

=
=
=
=

X

GRANT HUBBARD, justice, Butler chapter, enjoys a tale told by Dean Douglas R. Heidenreich, one of the Satur
day morning speakers. From left, Hubbard, Russell Maring, Corliss, Heidenreich and Mills Williams, Hammond.

y

a·b

= cre dit allowed employer

X

a

1

=b

against subsequent award.
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WM Surveys Bail System
A team of William Mitchell stu
dents, directed by · Professor Bill
Danforth will soon begin a survey
of the bail system in Ramsey county.
The survey will be conducted in
cooperation with the Ramsey county
district and the municipal court of
Saint Paul.
The aim of the survey will be to
assemble informatin to show the
present operation of the bail system
in Ramsey county, and suggest
whether persons accused of a crime
mighzt sometimes be released on
their own recogniance, without be
ing required to post bail.
In recent years some members
of the legal profession have come
to believe the bail system in the
United States imposes an unneces
sary and discriminatory burden on
the poor.
The suggestion of this group is
many an accused is as effectively
held within the jurisdiction of the
court by the ties of home, family
and employment, as by a bail bond
furnished to the court.

The Manhattan bail project has
successfully employed a system of
releasing an accussed on his o:wn
recognizance when investigation
shows he is settled in the community
and does not have a record of prior
offenses.

The survey to be conducted in
Ramsey county will be directed to
ward gathering information which
will enable the courts to determnie
whether such a system would work
here.
Information will be gathered by
interviewing judges of the district
and municipal courts, attorneys in
the county attorney's office, and by
obtaining statistical data from the
clerks of court.
The information obtained will be
studied and organized by the survey
team, and then submitted to the
judges in Ramsey county, assisting
them in evaluating the operation of
the bail system.
Funds of $3,000 for the survey
will be provided by Legal Assistance
of Ramsey County, Inc., which in
turn receives a large portion of its
funds from the federal Office of
Economic Opportunity.
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New Classes as Electives

for Seniors Next Year
By

DORIS HusPENI
STAFF WRITER

In furtherance of William Mit
chell's goal of greater flexibility
and more course variety, several
electives will be open to fourth year
students next year. Dean Heiden
reich will again offer a jurispru
dence course. This small, discus
sion-type .class, tentatively sched
uled for first semester, concentrates
on the writings of legal philosoph
ers.
Prof. Armour will, for the third
consecutive year, conduct an es
tate planning seminar, scheduled
for second semester. This class,
limited to 15 students, deals with
the application of principles learned
in income-gift-and estate-tax class
es, as well as with trusts and wills.
Included in the new offerings
next year will be a government con
tracts course by Prof. Lauck. This
elective, open to fourth year stu
dents, will be offered first semester.
According to Dean Heidenreich,
plans are also underway to rein
state the workmen's compensation
course as a senior class elective
next year. And an insurance course
is also being considered as a long
range possibility.

News of Our Alumni
1954
WILLIAM J. CORRICK an
nounced that ROLF T. NELSON
has joined him as partner in the
firm of Corrick, Miller, Meyer and
Nelson. Nelson is a member of the
Minnesota House of Representa
tives, representing Robbinsdale
Golden Valley district 3 lB.
1960
THEODORE J. COLLINS and
DAVID O'CONNOR, both 1960
Mitchell grads, have formed a part
nership along with Sidney A.
Abramson in St. Paul. O'Connor
was in private practice with a law
firm in St. Paul prior to the new
partnership.
Collins was a city prosecutor for
St. Paul as well as a private prac
titioner. The third partner, Abram
son, is special assistant U.S. Dis
trict Attorney charged with prose
cuting the American Allied case;
prior to formation of the partner
ship, he was first assistant U.S.
District Attorney for Minnesota.

Advice Clinics Aid Poor, Led by 35 Attorneys
By Lee LaBore
Staff Writer
Are the poor denied competent
legal advice?
No longer in Minneapolis, be
cause a group of 35 attorneys have
joined to establish Legal Advice
Clinics a non-profit professional
corpor~tion which aims to provide
free legal counsel to those who
would not otherwise be able to
afford it.
The organization received its
charter and acceptance from the
Hennepin county bar association
in 1966 and has set up four legal
offices in key poverty pockets in the
mill city.
The program is patterned after
similar organizations in Chicago
and Boston. It is made up primarily
by young graduate attorneys, mem
bers of some of the finest firms in
Minneapolis.
Each attorney works about two
hours a month - from 6: 30 to
8:30 p.m., usually in settlement
houses.
Why the legal advice clinics?
Peter Weiss, chairman of the
board, a corporate and business
law:.est.~tes attorney said: "My asso
ciation with legal advice clinics
awards me an opportunity to get
experience in domestic relations,
creditors and debtors remedies,
landlord and tenant problems, mi
nor contract problems and criminal
law cases which are areas of the
faw seldom experienced by myself

and fellow members; in addition,
we as a group feel the legal pro•
fession has a professional respon
sibility to increase the availability
of legal advice to the poor."
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Yet all these instances of dedica
tion cannot reach the masses of
poor and as a result most attorneys
are considered high brows who only
cater to the elite.

According to the department of
The 35 attorneys hope to create
Health Education and Welfare,
about 20 per cent of our popula a legal half-way house for the poor.
The less privileged can take their
tion is said to live in poverty - that
is one man in five is without in legal problems to these men who
c~me sufficient to support mini ask for personal information and
mum daily needs. Although the then conduct a private interview to
percentage may not be as high in pin down the legal problem.
Why a limited operation?
our area, there are still many who
Participating
attorneys couldn't
quality as "poor" and who do not
understand the law may be at their possibly start a program of legal aid
disposal as well as at the hands of which would undermine to any ap
preciable extent their full-time
the more affluent.
obligations to their firms and
The poor feel their very lives
clients. That's why they moved in
depend upon statute after statute,
the part-time direction, acting pri
agency after agency, unemployment
marily as a referral help-answer
compensation, relief, social securi
the-easy-issue service.
ty, · veterans benefits and food
Cases requiring court action or
stamps.
continual attention are always
So perhaps it's understandable screened and referred to the Legal
why a poor man who gets conned Aid Society, the Hennepin County
into buying a lemon of a used car Attorneys Referral Service or other
is outraged at a law which permits appropriate agencies, e.g., welfare
the finance company holding his
or public defender.
note to repossess upon his default
Frequently the attorneys will not
and even sue him for deficiency.
only call ahead to the agency to
It is perfectly true through the arrange as favorable a reception as
Legal Aid Society in Minneapolis · possible for the client but will keep
and through the public defenders in touch with both client and
office, many lawyers serve the poor agency until final disposition.
with extraordinary dedication and
When necessary, suitable tele
effort - but with pay - and count phone calls and followup letters are
less other attorneys in private prac made in behalf of clients.
tice give hours of legal assistance
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at little or no charge.
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COLLINS

1962
CHARLES L. LANGER has re
signed his post as business adminis
trator of the Metropolitan Mos
quito Control District to enter pri
vate law practice.
Langer has been with the district
more than nine years, since its in
ception in 1958, installing and
maintaining all business and ac
counting procedures.
He previously
served as con
troller for the
'
G. M. Steward
.
Lumber Co.,
Mpls., control
ler treasurer for
the Pappin Con
struction Co.,
G r e a t F a 11 s,
Montana,
and
LANGER
controller - registrar for a unit of the University of
Montana.
Langer received a B.B.A. degree
from the University of Minnesota
in 1946, he has also been an in
structor at Mitchell since gradua
tion.
He joined John W. Terpstra and
Richard A. Merril April 1. The
new firm 1s Terpstra, Merril and
Langer.
1963
FLOYD B. OLSON and LAW
RENCE A. LUNDGREN an-
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nounce they have joined the firm of
Newman, Olson and Lundgren,
Mpls.
1963
JAMES F. NELSON has been
named a partner of W. A. Winter
in Greenwood. Nelson purchased
the interest of the late Philip B.
Rolig. The firm will be known as
Winter and Nelson.
1965
ROBERT F. COLLINS has been
appointed assistant public defender
for Dakota county. He also recent
ly became a partner in the firm of
Thuet and Todd, South St. Paul.
1965
ALAN W. FALCONER is now
associated with the firm of Wagner
and Johnston, Falconer was form
erly with Honeywell, Inc., credit
and legal departments.
1966
RONALD E. ORCHARD has
opened a private office in West St.
Paul.
1966
LEW SCHWARTZ has become
a partner in the firm, Bard, Mac
Eachron, Braddock, Bartz and
Schwartz, Mpls.
He worked
previously as an
associate of the
firm. Schwartz
holds a B.E. de
gree from the
University of
Minnesota and a
Juris Doctor
from Mitchell.
He also became
SCHWARTZ
registered as a
patent agent, entitled to practice
patent law in 1964, and became a
registered patent attorney in 1966
after being admitted to practice be
fore the Supreme Court of Minne
sota.

Students Vital to
OEO Legal Services
Law students are the most im
portant segment of the legal pro
fession as far as the Office of Eco
nomic Opportunity Legal Services
Program is concerned, according
to that federal agency's director,
Earl Johnson.
Johnson's remarks were ad
dressed to the December American
Law Student Association Confer
ence on the Role of the Law Stu
dent in Extending Legal Services to
the Poor held in Chicago, Illinois.
The new ideas, the new concepts
and the new changes in the law are
largely attributable to the new
blood that has come into the legal
aid movement through this pro
gram, Johnson told the delegates
from nearly 20 midwestern law
schools at the ALSA conference.
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MITCHELL MEN clerking for Minnesota state supreme court justices, are from left, Mike Murphy, second
year, Hugh Plunkett III, third, Dave Peterson and John Hirte, fourth year. Apparently "justice" Hirte is unimpressed
by his cohorts' arguments •

